Embedded Files
In early 2025, the Trump Administration removed from public view many online resources relating to foreign influence in elections.
These resources include publications from the Cyber Security and Infrastructure Agency (CISA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI). Documents removed or made inaccessible include a resource library on election security, numerous resources relating to Russia's disinformation efforts, and a rumor versus reality FAQ.
In the Foreign Interference in Elections Collection, DODO has identified, described, and provided links to archived or PDF versions of these resources. The collection is only possible because of the Wayback Machine, an initiative of the Internet Archive, that archives and preserves websites.
We will update this page as we learn of new election-related resource removals.
Click on the "removal details" to find out more about when the resource was made inaccessible and whether archived versions are available.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is an agency in the Department of Homeland Security, responsible for cybersecurity and infrastructure protection across all levels of government, coordinating cybersecurity programs with U.S. states, and improving the government's cybersecurity protections against private and nation-state hackers. It plays an important role in ensuring the security of U.S. elections from cyber attacks. Numerous resources were archived* and removed** from the CISA website in February 2025.
Election Security Resource Library
Election Security Resource Library
CISA's Election Security Resource Library provided free resources intended to help state, local, tribal and territorial governments, stakeholders, and the public understand and mitigate risks to election security.
The library included resources on ensuring physical security of election infrastructure, cybersecurity, aspects of operational risk, disinformation and foreign operations, and election infrastructure subsector and security services, as well as a section containing joint materials CISA published with other agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).
Resources (as they appeared in January 2025) are listed and linked to below.
Physical Security
Physical Security of Voting Locations and Election Facilities
Ballot Drop Box Security Best Practices for Incendiary Devices
Swatting Prevention and Response Guidance for Election Workers and Law Enforcement
Cybersecurity
No Downtime in Elections: A Guide to Mitigating Risks of Denial of Service
Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
Actions to Counter Email-Based Attacks on Election-Related Entities
Cyber Incident Detection and Notification Planning Guide for Election Security
Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return
Transitioning to .GOV: Helping Mitigate Election Office Cybersecurity and Impersonation Risks
Operational Risk
Overview of the 2024 Presidential Election Post-Election Process
How Priority Telecommunications Services (PTS) Assist in Election Security
2024 General Election: Cross-Sector Checklist to Support Elections
Election Mail Handling Procedures to Protect Against Hazardous Materials
CISA Insights: Chain of Custody and Critical Infrastructure Systems
Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation
Election Infrastructure Subsector
Supply Chain Risks to Election Infrastructure Subsector Infographic (SCC)
DHS Election Infrastructure Security Funding Consideration (GCC)
Election Infrastructure Subsector Specific Plan (Joint GCC-SCC)
Joint Releases with Federal Partners
Federal Executive Branch Agencies Roles and Responsibilities in United States Elections
2022: Foreign Actors Likely to Use Information Manipulation Tactics for 2022 Midterm Elections
2022: Malicious Cyber Activity Against Election Infrastructure Unlikely to Disrupt or Prevent Voting
Election Security Services
View removal details here.
Resources for election administrators
Resources for election administrators
CISA Insights: Preparing for and Mitigating Foreign Influence Operations Targeting Critical Infrastructure
CISA Insights: Preparing for and Mitigating Foreign Influence Operations Targeting Critical Infrastructure
This resource, part of the "CISA Insights" series, highlights risks posed by influence operations using social media and online platforms. In the resource, CISA explained that "[i]n light of developing Russia-Ukraine geopolitical tensions, the risk of foreign influence operations affecting domestic audiences has increased." It sets out an approach in which election administrators should assess the information environment, identify vulnerabilities, fortify communication channels, engage in proactive communication, and develop an incident response plan.
The English version of the resource is available here and the Spanish version here.
View removal details here.
Election Disinformation Toolkit
Election Disinformation Toolkit
This toolkit was intended to "highlight tactics used by foreign government-backed disinformation campaigns that seek to disrupt American life and the infrastructure that underlies it." It include talking points and FAQs for election officials so they could "emphasize their role as “trusted voices” for election information" and "spread the importance of “we’re all in this together” in reducing the impacts of disinformation campaigns on elections."
The FAQ section addresses questions like:
What are the different types of false information?
Who are the primary malign actors associated with the spreading of election-related disinformation?
How is false information spread?
What can you do to stop the spread of disinformation?
View removal details here.
Election Infrastructure Insider Threat Mitigation Guide
Election Infrastructure Insider Threat Mitigation Guide
This guide was intended to help election infrastructure stakeholders increase their awareness of insider threats and establish insider threat mitigation programs. Insiders are those with access to election equipment such as staff and contractors who may, unwittingly or intentionally, compromise election security.
View removal details here.
Election Security Navigators Program Guidebook
Election Security Navigators Program Guidebook
This guidebook was a resource for states considering an election security navigator program to "enhance support to local election offices." As explained in the guide's landing page, "[n]avigator programs empower states to apply the expertise of a small group of personnel broadly, resulting in a force multiplier effect across jurisdictions."
The guidebook describes the logic behind navigator programs, describes the different models and functions of programs, the funding and resource considerations, and how to build out a program.
A Spanish language version of the guidebook was also available.
View removal details here.
Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation: Planning and Incident Response Guide for Election Officials
Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation: Planning and Incident Response Guide for Election Officials
This resource provided an overview of how to recognize, prepare for, and respond to misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation ("MDM") threats that may impact the ability to conduct elections.
View removal details here.
Rumor Control Page Start-Up Guide
Rumor Control Page Start-Up Guide
The Rumor Control Page Start-Up Guide was a resource for administrators seeking to dispel misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation ("MDM") narratives.
A Spanish language version of the start-up guide was also available.
View removal details here.
Securing Election Infrastructure Against the Tactics of Foreign Malign Influence Operations
Securing Election Infrastructure Against the Tactics of Foreign Malign Influence Operations
In this resource, CISA, along with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and FBI, aim "to inform critical infrastructure stakeholders, especially election infrastructure stakeholders, on the tactics of foreign malign influence operations and best practices to mitigate their impact."
The resource details tactics used by foreign actors to interfere with U.S. elections, like "disguising proxy media," "voice cloning of public figures," "manufacturing false evidence" of security incidents, "leveraging social media platforms." It then outlines steps election administrators can take to mitigate the risk, including communicating early, promoting transparency, securing systems, accounts, and public-facing content, and educating stakeholders and staff.
The document defines the "usual suspects" in foreign malign influence as Russia, China, and Iran. Notably, the Russian state's malign activities are mentioned over 20 times in the resource. For example:
"Russian Federation-linked proxy news sites masquerading as U.S. local news outlets."
“'typo squatting,' a method recently observed in Russian Federation influence networks, where a URL (website name) for a proxy website is one or a few characters away from the actual well known media website name."
"the Russian Federation compromised the email account of a former British official and stole classified documents, then leaked the documents ahead of the British elections in 2019."
"Russian influence operators use Telegram, a foreign-based messaging platform with less stringent moderation policies, to spread overt and covert influence messaging to audiences abroad."
View removal details here.
Resources for the public
Resources for the public
Election Security Rumor vs. Reality
Election Security Rumor vs. Reality
This resource was designed to "address common disinformation narratives by providing accurate information related to elections." It carefully debunks a wide array of myths and rumors about US elections, including:
Drop boxes used by election officials to collect returned mail-in/absentee ballots can be easily tampered with, stolen, or destroyed.
Votes are being cast on behalf of dead people and these votes are being counted.
A malicious actor can easily defraud an election by printing and sending in extra mail-in ballots.
Vulnerabilities in election technology mean that elections have been hacked and hackers are able to change election results.
More votes in one contest than other contests on the ballot means that results cannot be trusted.
If results as reported on election night change over the ensuing days or weeks, the process is hacked or compromised, so I can’t trust the results.
The English language version of the resource was available only as an HTML page. For convenience of access, we have created a PDF of the resource: Election Security Rumor vs. Reality.
Versions are also available in Spanish (PDF): Rumor vs. Realidad; Korean, and Chinese.
View removal details here.
Federal Executive Branch Agencies Roles and Responsibilities in United States Elections
Federal Executive Branch Agencies Roles and Responsibilities in United States Elections
This publication sets out the role of the federal executive branch in elections, including the Department of Homeland Security, CISA, the Department of Justice (DOJ), FBI, United States Postal Inspection Service and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). It includes a discussion of the DOJ's role in "enforcing federal criminal law prohibiting unlawful threats of violence against election workers, and prohibiting voter intimidating and voter suppression."
View removal details here.
Just So You Know: Foreign Threat Actors Likely to Use a Variety of Tactics to Develop and Spread Disinformation During 2024 U.S. General Election Cycle
Just So You Know: Foreign Threat Actors Likely to Use a Variety of Tactics to Develop and Spread Disinformation During 2024 U.S. General Election Cycle
This joint CISA FBI public service announcement from October 18, 2024 warned that "[f]oreign threat actors are knowingly disseminating false claims and narratives that seek to undermine the American people’s confidence in the security and legitimacy of the election process,’ with a particular focus on generative AI. The PSA goes on to document Russian and Iranian efforts at spoofing news sites.
View removal details here.
Tactics of Disinformation
Tactics of Disinformation
This factsheet contains descriptions and examples of the different tactics malign actors take to spread disinformation. It is a comprehensive resource that covers tactics like:
Cultivating fake or misleading personas and websites.
Creating deepfakes and synthetic media.
Devising or amplifying conspiracy theories.
Astroturfing and flooding the information environment
A Spanish language version is available here.
View removal details here.
Election 2020 Resources
Election 2020 Resources
CISA archived a series of joint CISA-FBI press releases and other Election 2020 disinformation-related resources and made them more difficult to access. A banner stating "In an effort to keep CISA.gov current, the archive contains outdated information that may not reflect current policy or programs." was added to the landing pages of each resource (see image below).
This joint CISA FBI public service announcement from September 22, 2020 warned that "foreign actors and cybercriminals could exploit the time required to certify and announce elections’ results by disseminating disinformation, including reports of "voter suppression, cyberattacks targeting election infrastructure, voter or ballot fraud, and other problems intended to convince the public of the elections’ illegitimacy."
This joint CISA FBI public service announcement from October 1, 2020 warned that foreign "intelligence services have used online journals, including some with a global reach, to exacerbate disunity and dysfunction in the United States while also misinforming or misleading readers."
This public service announcement provided information on spoofed internet domains and tips for identifying spoofed website links.
This infographic provided a timeline of post-election processes for the 2020 presidential election from the close of polls on Election Day, November 3, 2020, to Inauguration Day on January 20, 2021.
Election 2022 Resources
Election 2022 Resources
CISA archived Election 2022 disinformation-related resources and made them more difficult to access. Here are a few examples:
A joint FBI CISA public service announcement, released on October 6, 2022, warning the public that foreign actors may circulate or amplify reports of real or alleged cyber attacks on election infrastructure, disseminate false claims about voter suppression, voter or ballot fraud, and other false information "intended to undermine confidence in the election processes and influence public opinion" about the 2022 elections' legitimacy.
This report provided "a declassified overview of findings from a classified joint report from the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security."
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) functions as the head of the United States Intelligence Community, overseeing and directing the National Intelligence Program. The Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) News Room was removed from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) website in February 2025. The FMIC focuses on mitigating threats to democracy and U.S. national interests from foreign malign influence.
Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) News Room
Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) News Room
The FMIC News Room was a collection of regular updates on election security, often focused on Russian intervention. For example, the update from late October 2024 linked to on the News Room, begins by explaining:
Foreign actors — particularly Russia, Iran, and China — remain intent on fanning divisive narratives to divide Americans and undermine Americans’ confidence in the U.S. democratic system consistent with what they perceive to be in their interests, even as their tactics continue to evolve.
Below are links to archived versions of the 2024 content from the newsroom:
Securing Election Infrastructure Against the Tactics of Foreign Malign Influence Operations
FMI Primer: An Introduction to Foreign Malign Influence (The primer itself is available here.)
View removal details here.
Federal Bureau of Intelligence
Federal Bureau of Intelligence
The Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) is a domestic intelligence and security service of the United States, which acts as the US government's principal federal law enforcement agency. In March 2025, the FBI removed resources on its website relating to combating foreign influence in elections.
Combating Foreign Influence
Combating Foreign Influence
The "Combating Foreign Influence" section of the FBI's website was a collection of resources relating to foreign influence operations. The landing page explained:
Foreign influence operations—which include covert actions by foreign governments to influence U.S. political sentiment or public discourse—are not a new problem. But the interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of the Internet, have changed the nature of the threat and how the FBI and its partners must address it. The goal of these foreign influence operations directed against the United States is to spread disinformation, sow discord, and, ultimately, undermine confidence in our democratic institutions and values.
The FBI is the lead federal agency responsible for investigating foreign influence operations. In the fall of 2017, Director Christopher Wray established the Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) to identify and counteract malign foreign influence operations targeting the United States.
Foreign influence operations have taken many forms and used many tactics over the years. Most widely reported these days are attempts by adversaries—hoping to reach a wide swath of Americans covertly from outside the United States—to use false personas and fabricated stories on social media platforms to discredit U.S. individuals and institutions.
The section linked to numerous resources (see image below). Central to the section was the "Protected Voices" initiative, which was also removed from the website (see the next section).
View removal details here.
Protected Voices Initiative
Protected Voices Initiative
The "Protected Voices" section of its website. The Protected Voices initiative provided tools and resources to political campaigns, companies, and individuals to protect against online foreign influence operations, cyber threats, and federal election crimes. The Protected Voices initiative included a large video repository, which is now inaccessible (see image below). These videos included:
View removal details here.
Glossary
Glossary
* ARCHIVED
The term "archived" means that the content is still available online, often at the original URL, but links to the archived page from other pages are removed and/or a note is placed on the page that is no longer current.
** REMOVED
The term "removed" means that the content has been taken down off the website. The original URL may return a 404 or "Page Not Found" error or redirect to a homepage or other page without the substantive content.
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